On May 14, 2026, a Rohingya man, Hasan Ahmed (45), a member of the Zakir Bahini, was shot dead by a Rohingya armed group, Saddam Bahini, at the Nayapara registered Rohingya refugee camp in the Teknaf Upazila (Sub-District) of Cox’s Bazar District. Police stated that members of the Rohingya armed group carried out the attack over dominance in the refugee camp, control of the mosque committee, and past enmity.
On May 12, 2026, a Rohingya youth, Hasmat Ullah (22), was shot at and injured in a clash between Rohingya armed groups at the B Block of Camp-8 at the Balukhali refugee camp in the Ukhiya Upazila of Cox’s Bazar District. According to the Police and Rohingya leaders, a dispute broke out between the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), a Rohingya armed group known as the Nabi Hossain Bahini, and another armed group, the Arakan Rohingya Organization (ARO), over dominance in the refugee camp, resulting in the incident.
On May 6, 2026, Mohammad Kamal Prakash Noor (45), the younger brother of Nabi Hossain, was killed in a shooting incident by unidentified assailants at the B-41 block of Camp-8 West in the Balukhali refugee camp in Ukhiya Upazila. It was also reported that Kamal was killed in suspected Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) firing due to the conflict between ARSA and ARA.
On May 5, 2026, ARO ‘commander’ Kefayet Ullah Halim (45) was killed in a gunfight with ARSA in the Tarjar Bridge area of the Balukhali refugee camp in Ukhiya Upazila. Two others who sustained gunshot injuries were identified as Mohammad Ullah (37) and Nur Mohammad (32). Under Halim’s leadership, ARO had been involved in anti-ARSA activities inside the refugee camp.
On May 4, 2026, a Rohingya youth, Mohammad Ullah (20), was arrested by the Police during an operation at the Leda Shelter Home in the Hnila Union of the Teknaf Upazila on charges of involvement with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Police added that Mohammad Ullah was an active member of a WhatsApp group called Hakiqat News, affiliated with TTP. The group operates in Urdu and is accused of encouraging terrorist activities through international media platforms.
On April 28, 2026, the Detective Branch (DB) of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) arrested four ARSA cadres – Imran Chowdhury (29), his brother Mostakim Chowdhury (25), Ripon Hossain Sheikh (28), and Abu Bakar (25) – from the Keraniganj and Kamrangirchar areas of Dhaka, for their links with TTP.
According to partial data collated by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), at least four persons were killed and three injured (one Rohingya and two ARO cadres), linked to the Rohingya insurgency inside Bangladesh, this year (data till May 24, 2026). Further, 14 Rohingyas – including five linked with TTP, four with a trafficking ring, three drug traffickers, one ARSA ‘commander’, and one linked with ARA – have been arrested in Bangladesh this year, so far. In 2025, at least 37 people were killed, including three civilians and 34 militants. There were also 14 such arrests in 2025, including five cadres each from ARSA and ARA, and four from the Arakan Army.
In 2024, at least 42 people were killed in Rohingya-insurgency linked violence. The number stood at 95 in 2023, 22 in 2022 and nine in 2021.
The recent incidents in the Rohingya refugee camps, mainly in Cox’s Bazar, indicate an increasingly fragmented and militarised environment, where multiple armed Rohingya groups have been competing for territorial dominance, influence over camp governance structures, recruitment networks, and access to the illicit drug economy. The killings and shootings involving ARA/Nabi Hossain Bahini, ARSA, ARO, Saddam Bahini, and Zakir Bahini demonstrate that the camps are no longer witnessing isolated criminal rivalries, but rather sustained factional warfare among armed groups with evolving command structures.
The targeting of Majhis (local level leaders) and ‘commanders’ is particularly significant because these figures often serve as intermediaries between refugees, aid agencies, and Bangladeshi authorities. Their assassination reflects attempts by armed groups to capture informal governance mechanisms within the camps. While one Majhi each has been killed in year 2026 (so far), 2025, and 2024, year 2023 had recorded six Majhis killed.
The five Rohingya arrests made in Bangladesh this year in connection with TTP introduce a transnational extremist dimension that raises broader regional security concerns. While the cases currently appear limited to online radicalisation and digital propaganda dissemination, they highlight the vulnerability of displaced Rohingya youth to external extremist narratives amid prolonged statelessness, unemployment, insecurity, and frustration within the camps.
Although there is no evidence yet of a formal TTP infrastructure operating inside Bangladesh’s Rohingya camps, the presence of ideological sympathisers or digital facilitators could potentially create future pathways for cross-border terrorist networking involving actors from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Myanmar.
The Rohingya population remains concentrated in the bordering areas of Myanmar, particularly the Rakhine State, and crises or persecution targeting the community have repeatedly triggered refugee flows into neighbouring Bangladesh. On May 18, 2026, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report titled Skeletons and Skulls Scattered Everywhere: Arakan Army Massacre of Rohingya Muslims in Hoyasiri, Myanmar, from Bangkok, Thailand, describing the incident as a serious human rights violation, although the Arakan Army (AA) has never claimed responsibility for the massacre in the remote village of Myanmar. HRW reported that, on May 2, 2024, AA opened fire on unarmed villagers, with some of the survivors fleeing for safety into Bangladesh and Malaysia. HRW’s investigation found that the Myanmar military failed to take adequate measures to protect civilians. Meenakshi Ganguly, Deputy Asia Director, HRW, stated,
| The Arakan Army’s killing of hundreds of Rohingya civilians and burning down their villages in Rakhine State in 2024 has taken the conflict with the country’s junta to a new level of brutality… The Arakan Army continues to hold the survivors captive. They have received no redress from the Arakan Army. Those responsible have not been held accountable. |
Further, landmines planted by AA and abductions carried out by the group continue to threaten Rohingya living in the border areas between Bangladesh and Myanmar. According to Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) data, at least 165 fishermen, who were detained by AA, between December 8, 2024 and May 12, 2026, when the AA seized Maungdaw (Myanmar) and took control of the Myanmar side of the border, still remain in the custody of the AA.
During the same period, BGB brought back 234 fishermen. According to reports, landmines have been planted by AA in nearby border areas inside Myanmar to prevent the movement of armed Rohingya groups, which impacts the lives of people living near border areas in Bangladesh, especially the Rohingya who fled previously from that area. In a recent incident, on April 10, 2026, a Rohingya man, Mohammad Sadek (25), was injured in a landmine explosion that occurred on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in the Balukhali area of the Ukhiya Upazila in Cox’s Bazar District. In another incident, on March 29, 2026, a Rohingya teenager, Abdul Hakim (15), was injured in a landmine explosion engineered by AA at the zero line of the Naf River on the Balukhali border in the Palangkhali Union of the Ukhiya Upazila in Cox’s Bazar District.
Additionally, Bangladeshi civilians and Rohingya residing in Cox’s Bazar have become victims of cross-border firing arising from clashes involving AA, Rohingya armed groups, and junta airstrikes in Rakhine State. For instance, on February 7, 2026, nine-year-old Huzaifa Sultana Afnan, who was fatally injured by a stray bullet fired from across the Myanmar border, succumbed to injuries in Dhaka. Afnan was critically injured in cross-border gunfire on January 11, 2026, amid ongoing clashes in Myanmar.
Meanwhile, on January 17, 2026, at least 18 members of the Mro ethnic minority were injured during an attack at Janali Para in the Nayapara Union of the Alikadam Upazila in Bandarban District. The attack was reportedly orchestrated by Rohingyas and settlers. Such incidents have the potential to further destabilize the already precarious security situation in the region.
When elections were conducted in Bangladesh this year after a tumultuous and chaotic 18 months, Rohingya militancy also emerged as an obstacle to the smooth conduct of the polls. In early January 2026, a Home Ministry report warned that the presence of armed groups and illegal weapons inside Rohingya camps, and the use of Camp-in-Charge outpasses or illegal crossing of barbed-wire fences into Ukhiya-Teknaf localities, could worsen the law-and-order situation.
The report also cautioned that active social groups inside camps could spread rumours or provocative messages to destabilise the environment, while armed groups such as ARSA, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the AA could engage in clashes in border areas during the election period, creating fear among the public. The Election Commission and the Home Ministry were informed about a series of steps to mitigate risks involving Rohingyas during the election period. BGB was also directed to strengthen patrols ahead of elections, with heightened surveillance on armed groups along the Myanmar border.
During the same period before elections, Bangladesh issued a high alert along its border with Myanmar on January 12, 2026, after detaining 53 ARSA militants who had crossed into its territory, according to Dhaka paramilitary officials, reflecting cross-border threats.
On February 5, 2026, joint forces, including Police, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), and the Army, detained 345 Rohingyas – including 176 men, 86 women, and 83 children and adolescents – during a late-night operation in Burma Colony under the Dohazari Municipality of Chandanaish Upazila in Chittagong District. Later, on February 8, 2026, at least 1,500 Rohingya refugees were detained in Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar, during an Army-led joint security operation ahead of the February 12 parliamentary elections. The operation targeted Rohingyas living outside designated camps in the Balukhali and Palongkhali areas of Ukhiya Upazila.
The deepening Rohingya militancy represents a complex amalgamation of terrorism and a humanitarian crisis, posing a significant challenge for Bangladesh. Statelessness and the prolonged identity crisis among the Rohingya are increasingly pushing sections of the community toward militancy rather than integration for a stable future. According to the latest report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 149,769 Rohingya refugees were newly registered in Bangladesh between December 2024 and March 31, 2026, reflecting continued displacement linked to conflict and insecurity in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, as reported on May 14, 2026. UNHCR stated that the total registered Rohingya refugee population in camps across Bangladesh currently stands at approximately 1,194,123.
Recent incidents and broad trends collectively point toward several emerging risks, including violent competition among multiple Rohingya armed groups inside the camps, the gradual emergence of transnational security threats through potential extremist linkages and online radicalisation, and continuing obstacles to Rohingya repatriation due to persistent violence and mistrust in Myanmar involving both the Myanmar military and AA. Bangladesh continues to face the challenge of balancing internal security within densely populated refugee camps, while simultaneously managing its borders, growing illicit trade, and the complexities of addressing the Rohingya crisis through diplomatic channels.
The author Shivangi Sharma is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Conflict Management
