Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) is quietly rebuilding its presence in Bangladesh to keep a close watch on India’s eastern and northeastern states as well as the Bay of Bengal region. According to multiple sources, a recent visit by a high-level Pakistani military delegation to Dhaka included ISI officers with an agenda of deepening covert cooperation with Bangladeshi agencies.
That is different from the limited influence that ISI maintained in Bangladesh during the long tenure of Sheikh Hasina when Dhaka’s security policies strongly aligned with those of New Delhi.
The delegation, headed by General Shamsad Mirza, had a series of meetings with top officials from Bangladesh’s National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the DGFI. People who know the details of the discussions said that both sides explored the possibility of a joint intelligence-sharing mechanism. The proposed arrangement would focus on surveillance across India’s northeastern states and nearby maritime zones in the Bay of Bengal.
Bangladesh watchers say the development is part of Pakistan’s wider strategy to rebuild old intelligence networks on India’s eastern border. Traditionally, before Bangladesh came into being as a sovereign nation in 1971, there was a strong presence of Pakistan’s military and spy services in the then East Pakistan. Analysts believe the ISI may now see an opportunity to re-establish influence, particularly after Sheikh Hasina’s government—known for its firm stance against Pakistan-supported elements—lost control.
During Hasina’s rule from 2009 to 2024, Dhaka acted firmly against ISI-linked activities. India’s security establishment often credited her government with helping prevent extremist networks, including those allegedly supported by Pakistan, from targeting India’s northeast through Bangladeshi territory. But then there was a political shift in the country in 2024, when widespread student protests and opposition-led unrest unseated Hasina, thereby opening new space for actors previously kept at bay.
Sources say that the ISI had previously been silently working through political and religious groups sympathetic to it, including sections of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami. These networks, among others, were reportedly involved in the protests leading to Hasina’s ouster. The current effort to increase ISI’s presence may thus be a reward and strategic in the sense of extending cooperation with sympathetic forces in Dhaka and countering Indian influence.
Analysts say that these places could aim at three objectives: Keeping an eye on border security movement, tracking maritime activity, and strengthening connections with networks sympathetic to Pakistan’s interests. The southeastern coastline of Bangladesh is also seen to provide a cover for discreet operations, particularly around Teknaf and the Rohingya camps near Cox Bazar.
Security experts in New Delhi believe the ISI’s renewed focus on Bangladesh reflects not only Islamabad’s intent to gather intelligence on India’s east but an effort to cultivate alternative routes for influence in the region. With the Taliban takeover constricting traditional operations in Afghanistan, Islamabad might see Bangladesh as a less obvious but strategically advantageous arena for its influence.
Apparently, the ISI’s expansion in Bangladesh has marked a silent yet significant reshaping of the intelligence landscape in the region. For India, this raises familiar concerns about the porous eastern frontier and renewed espionage or militant activity. For Bangladesh, the challenge is to balance national interests in a rapidly changing regional dynamics with external pressures. How far this outreach results in lasting collaboration or mere cautious exchange depends on Dhaka’s political will and how New Delhi responds in the coming months.
