Kerala effectively consolidated its Maoist or Naxalite (Left-Wing Extremism, LWE)–free status in 2025, recording zero incidents and marking a decisive end to insurgent activity that had peaked during the third phase of the movement in the state following the formation of the Maoists’ Western Ghats Special Zone Committee (WGSZC) in 2011. This outcome builds on the minimal activity observed in 2024; the remaining cadres were either arrested or surrendered in 2025, leading to the state’s formal removal from India’s LWE-affected map.
On February 22, 2025, the Kerala Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), with assistance from the Tamil Nadu Q-Branch, arrested a prominent Maoist and People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) cadre, Santhosh aka Ravi aka Santosh Coimbatore aka Raja, at Hosur in Krishnagiri district, Tamil Nadu. According to the Police, his arrest – given his central role in PLGA activities in the Kerala–Karnataka–Tamil Nadu (KKT) tri-junction – could signify the effective end of the Maoist movement in the region. A member of the Naadukani and Kabani dalams (squads), Santhosh had been actively involved in armed insurgent activities since 2013 and was an accused in approximately 45 cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) across multiple jurisdictions in Kerala and outside.
Earlier, on January 8, 2025, in a development marking a decisive turn in the LWE movement in the state, six cadres of the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-Maoist) operating in the KKT tri-junction, surrendered before Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah at his official residence, Krishna, in Bengaluru. The group included Jisha from Wayanad, Kerala; Vasantha K from Vellore, Tamil Nadu; and Mundagaru Latha, Vanajakshi Balehole, Sundari Kutluru, and Mareppa Aroli from Karnataka. According to the Police, the cadres did not surrender their weapons, which were believed to have been disposed of in the forest.
With most CPI–Maoist leaders in the Western Ghats region eliminated or arrested, and the arrested cadres entangled in prolonged legal proceedings across multiple jurisdictions, the insurgency has been significantly weakened.
In this context, on March 25, 2026, former CPI-Maoist leader and WGSZC in-charge, Roopesh aka Praveen, was released from Viyyur Central Prison in Thrissur, Kerala after spending 11 years in custody, following the suspension of his life sentence by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, Tamil Nadu. He had been arrested on May 4, 2015, along with his wife Shyna and three other Maoist cadres at Karumathampatti in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. While the others were released earlier, Roopesh continues to face charges in 43 cases across various Police Stations in Kerala and beyond, including several under the UAPA. According to prison authorities, he has been acquitted or discharged in 14 cases and is required to appear before courts in the remaining cases.
In another case, on April 21, 2026, the Kerala High Court granted bail to three CPI-Maoist cadres – Rajan Chittilappally (Thrissur, Kerala), R. Raghavendran (Vellore, Tamil Nadu), and Deepak (Chhattisgarh) – after more than five years in custody in connection with the 2016 Nilambur arms case, which involved alleged illegal arms training in a reserve forest in the Malappuram district of Kerala. The court considered the prolonged period of incarceration in granting relief. Rajan was arrested on December 18, 2020, while Raghavendran and Deepak were arrested in 2021.
Kerala recorded no fatalities in LWE–linked violence in 2025, continuing the pattern observed in 2024. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the state has registered a total of 10 fatalities (all Maoists) in seven separate incidents across four districts – Palakkad, Wayanad, Malappuram, and Kannur since 2000 (data till May 3, 2026). Of these, one fatality occurred in 2014, two in 2016, five in 2019, and one each in 2020 and 2023. Significantly, no fatalities among civilians or Security Forces (SFs) have been recorded in LWE-related violence in the state during this period.
Of the 10 Maoists killed in the state, nine were eliminated in Security Force (SF) operations, all during the tenure of the successive Left Democratic Front (LDF) governments led by Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan. The remaining fatality occurred in 2014, when a Maoist cadre was killed in an accidental blast in Wayanad. Unsurprisingly, the first volume of the WGSZC English-language journal Communist, published in May 2017, identified Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan as the prime enemy of the Maoists fighting in the KKT tri-junction, citing the intensified counter-insurgency measures initiated after he assumed office in 2016.
Apart from their inability to execute any violent incidents, the evolving pattern of Maoist sightings in Kerala underscores a marked decline in their operational capacity and influence in the KKT tri-junction. According to data from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), the state recorded 152 Maoist sightings and 47 related UAPA cases in 2015; 131 and 48 in 2016; 118 and seven in 2017; 136 and 38 in 2018; 123 and 50 in 2019; 64 and 16 in 2020; 37 and 14 in 2021; 19 and 18 in 2022; 43 and 31 in 2023; and just 10 sightings with four cases in 2024. Significantly, no such incidents or cases have been reported in 2025, or in 2026, thus far.
Leading up to the UMHA’s official communication sent to states on April 8, 2026, declaring that no district in India remains affected by LWE, Kerala’s Wayanad and Kannur districts – previously identified as LWE-affected – had already been removed from the list in April 2025. This followed sustained security operations, including “Operation Safe Forest” in the KKT tri-junction, which indicated a halted insurgency, with no significant rebel movements reported.
As SFs intensify counter-Maoist operations in LWE-affected regions of central and eastern India as part of efforts to achieve a “Maoist-free India,” concerns have emerged regarding the potential southward movement of residual cadres. On April 17, 2026, Odisha Director General of Police (DGP) Yogesh Bahadur Khurania indicated that intelligence inputs suggested Maoists who had not surrendered by the Centre’s March 31, 2026, deadline were planning to relocate to Kerala and blend in as labourers.
This concern is reinforced by earlier developments. On October 13, 2025, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) units in Kochi and Ranchi, with the support of the Kerala Police, arrested a wanted CPI-Maoist leader, Sahan Tudi Dinabu, from the Munnar area of Idukki district, Kerala. A native of Jharkhand, Dinabu was the key accused in a Maoist-triggered bomb blast that killed three policemen in his home state. He had reportedly been living in concealment for over a year at the Gudarvilla estate in Munnar, posing as a migrant labourer, along with his wife.
However, no credible reports have emerged of any major relocation of northern cadres to the south. Instead, recent developments suggest that the remaining Maoist cadres are increasingly focused on personal survival rather than any organised or strategic relocation.
In another development, a youth from Ernakulam, Rejaz M. Sheeba Sydeek, suspected to be an “urban Naxal,” was arrested in Nagpur, Maharashtra, on May 8, 2025, on charges of ‘waging war against the state’ in connection with a controversial Instagram post related to Operation Sindoor. According to the Police, material recovered during initial searches was considered sufficient to classify him as a Maoist, leading to charges under the UAPA. Preliminary forensic analysis of his devices reportedly suggested links to ‘urban Naxal’ networks, including documents outlining plans for propaganda and the urban expansion of the banned CPI-Maoist. Investigators further alleged that he maintained contact with senior Maoist leader Kannan Murali aka Murali Kannampilly aka Ajith aka Konnath Muralidharan, a Central Committee (CC) member associated with propaganda and urban operations. Subsequent searches at his residence in Ernakulam, Kerala, led to the seizure of digital storage devices and documents, with the Police also claiming to have uncovered possible linkages to external handlers and other militant networks, including the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
Kerala’s Maoist movement has evolved through three distinct phases: the first in the 1960s, the second in the 1990s, and the third in the late 2000s, marked by the creation of a separate guerrilla zone in the Western Ghats region. In recent years, however, both the state and the wider KKT tri-junction have witnessed the near-total collapse of armed Maoist activity, reflected in the absence of major attacks, systematic leadership decapitation, and a sustained erosion of organisational capacity.
This transformation can be attributed, in part, to a calibrated policy shift that combined intensified counter-insurgency operations with a rehabilitative approach for cadres willing to surrender. Unlike earlier phases of the movement – when sympathisers could often expect relative leniency under Left-led administrations in the state – the current approach is characterised by a more uncompromising, security-centric posture.
Kerala’s success can be attributed to several key factors. First, sustained intelligence-led operations and coordinated inter-state policing have denied Maoists the sanctuary and mobility essential for guerrilla warfare; the difficult terrain of the Western Ghats, once considered advantageous, has instead constrained expansion and logistics. Second, the failure to establish a durable support base among local populations – including tribals – has limited recruitment and cadre replenishment. Third, sustained leadership attrition – through arrests, encounters, and surrenders – has progressively weakened the organisational core.
As the country moves toward the goal of a ‘Maoist-free’ status, Kerala’s absence of fatal Maoist violence, the dismantling of operational cadre presence, and the continuation of legal proceedings indicate that the state is approaching a functionally ‘Maoist-free’ condition. Nonetheless, the persistence of dormant ideological networks and over-ground fronts necessitates sustained policy attention beyond purely kinetic measures – integrating vigilant law enforcement, targeted development in vulnerable regions, and civil society engagement to ensure that the state’s long-term resilience against Maoist insurgency is maintained well into the future.
Author Nijeesh N – Research Associate; Institute for Conflict Management
