Punjab is witnessing a troubling pattern of attacks, particularly on police establishments, indicating a calibrated attempt by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to revive coordinated violence through hybrid means – an amalgamation of terrorism, organized crime, and cross-border facilitation.
On March 30, 2026, a low-intensity blast targeted a police facility at Bhindi Saidan in Amritsar district, marking an escalation following a series of approximately 24 grenade attacks on security establishments across the state since September 2024. Earlier, on February 22, 2026, two policemen were shot dead in a targeted attack at a Police Outpost in Adhian village, Gurdaspur district – located in a strategically sensitive area along the international border – underscoring a pattern of deliberate strikes against law enforcement.
Subsequent investigations into the March 30 blast led to the arrest of six operatives of an ISI-backed module on April 13, 2026, working under a Pakistan-based handler. The arrests provided critical insights into recruitment and financing patterns. According to official disclosures, the arrested youths had been recruited through ISI-linked handlers, with offers reportedly reaching INR 4 lakh for executing attacks on Police infrastructure.
Similarly, in the case involving the killing of two policemen – where one accused was killed in a subsequent Police encounter and another two were arrested – the perpetrators had also been recruited by ISI handlers for relatively small sums. This reflects a low-cost, high-impact model of proxy warfare, in which local recruits – often petty criminals and drug addicts – are incentivized to carry out acts of violence, with minimal operational exposure of external sponsors.
A parallel development further underscores the strategic depth of the networks that have been created. In a recent operation, the Delhi Police stated on April 10 that it had arrested 11 operatives – eight from Punjab and three from Delhi – linked to the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), who were involved in reconnaissance activities targeting sensitive military establishments. The group had reportedly installed CCTV systems and conducted surveillance of key Army locations across multiple sites, including Punjab, relaying inputs to ISI handlers across the border.
According to official claims, all 24 grenade attack cases targeting security establishments have been ‘solved’, with the Punjab Police dismantling the networks involved, arresting the accused, and facilitating the detention or deportation of several foreign-based handlers. Investigative findings indicate that some major modules were allegedly directed by ISI-backed Shahzad Bhatti, in coordination with Indian gangsters, including Jeshan Akhtar and Amandeep Singh aka Pannu, underscoring the nexus between cross-border handlers and domestic criminal elements.
Prior to the series of grenade attacks, Punjab witnessed a campaign of intimidation, most notably the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack on the State Intelligence Headquarters in Mohali in May 2022, followed by a similar RPG strike on the Sarhali Police Station in Tarn Taran in December 2022.
The vulnerability of Punjab’s sensitive international border belt has been underscored by major cross-border terrorist strikes in the past. The July 2015 Gurdaspur attack and the January 2016 Pathankot attack by Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups exposed gaps in border management and rapid response mechanisms. Unlike these incidents, recent ISI-sponsored modules appear to be adapting by targeting softer security infrastructure rather than high-value military sites. Current threat trends suggest evolution rather than escalation in scale: Pakistan-backed networks continue to operate through foreign-based handlers and local recruits, but their tactics have shifted toward deniable, low-intensity strikes aimed at eroding police morale and public confidence, without provoking major retaliation.
At present, Punjab faces a threefold challenge with cross-border linkages: first, attempts to revive both Islamist and Khalistani militant formations; second, the consolidation of narcotics and arms trafficking corridors; and third, the use of local gangs and criminal syndicates as proxies for targeted violence and intimidation. While the state’s security architecture retains significant capacity to manage ideologically driven militancy, the latter two vectors – embedded within criminal economies, drug networks, and an expanding gun culture among segments of the youth – constitute a more diffuse, adaptive, and potentially enduring threat.
The latest incidents expose critical security gaps in Punjab’s border villages. They also reveal a disturbing pattern: economically distressed local youths, lured by the promise of quick money, are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by foreign handlers. The alleged use of teenagers for reconnaissance by ISI-linked operatives deepens these concerns.
An emerging youth–gang nexus – fuelled by unemployment, drug abuse, and the lure of easy profits – is now intersecting with cross-border terrorist networks. Smuggling channels along vulnerable riverine and agricultural routes serve dual purposes, acting not only as conduits for narcotics and arms, but also as logistical pipelines for extremist activity. This convergence of organised crime and proxy militancy complicates counter-terrorism efforts and calls for a tightly integrated security and socio-economic response.
Dismantling the crime-terror nexus requires sustained financial investigations targeting drug proceeds and their channels. Without disrupting the economic backbone of these networks, tactical successes will remain temporary.
Punjab’s frontier is the theatre of a hybrid war – waged through drones, narcotics, arms trafficking, gangster networks, and ISI backing. The state’s response must be equally calibrated, combining precise enforcement with sustained community engagement and structural socio-economic intervention.
Author Nijeesh N – Research Associate; Institute for Conflict Management
