For most people, India–Russia trade story ends in two words: oil and weapons. Russia means cheap crude and fighter jets; India means a loyal buyer. But the latest Modi–Putin summit in Delhi is trying to rewrite that script. In the middle of steep 50 per cent US tariffs on India and fresh sanctions on Russian oil giants like Rosneft and Lukoil, Delhi and Moscow have quietly repeated a very loud promise: the two countries want to push their trade to $100 billion dollars by 2030, up from nearly $70 billion dollars now. And this time, the big push is not just about what Russia sends to India, but what India can finally start selling in bulk to Russia.
Vladimir Putin’s two‑day visit to India, his first after the Ukraine war erupted in 2024, came with a clear message. He called Russia a “reliable supplier” of oil, gas and coal and promised uninterrupted fuel shipments to support India’s fast‑growing economy.
This is not a small claim. After Western sanctions, Russia was forced to divert its crude to Asia, offering India massive discounts. Indian refiners grabbed that opportunity and turned Russian oil into a cornerstone of energy security.
Today, the trade is not just big, it is also different in how it is paid for. According to the joint statement, 96 per cent of commercial deals between the two sides now use national currencies rather than the dollar. Both countries want to go further – linking their national payment systems, financial messaging, and even future central bank digital currencies so that trade can continue smoothly, insulated from Western pressure.
On the Indian side, Narendra Modi framed the partnership as a bridge to the future. He talked about exports, co‑production and co‑innovation, and promised to push for a swift conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. The official joint statement went even deeper: it spoke about expanding trade in a “balanced and sustainable” way, increasing India’s exports to Russia, building industrial cooperation, and forging new technological and investment partnerships, especially in high‑technology sectors. In plain language, India does not just want to import more from Russia; it wants to sell more, and it wants factories, research and jobs to be part of that story.
Right now, the numbers tell a different tale. The trade gap between India and Russia has ballooned to about $58.9 billion dollars. Russia imported goods worth $202.6 billion dollars from the world in 2024, but only $4.84 billion dollars came from India.
That is just 2.4 per cent of Russia’s total import basket. The Global Trade Research Initiative, a Delhi‑based think tank, argues that India can lift exports to Russia seven‑fold – from $$5$$ to $35 billion dollars – if it cracks market access in four key sectors: food, pharmaceuticals, textiles and machinery.
This is where the comparison with Canadian pulses suddenly makes sense. Most Indians do not realise that their dal often travels from Canadian farms to Indian plates. In the same way, very few people know that Russia, which relies heavily on imported food and agriculture items, barely buys from India. There is a huge gap between potential and reality.
Look beyond the oil tankers and fighter jets and the picture becomes richer. Russia today sends India not just crude but also fertilisers, coal and some metals. India, in turn, ships out pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee, certain chemicals, iron and steel products, machinery components, textiles and garments.
But these exports are nowhere near the scale they could reach. Russian supermarket shelves could easily carry far more Indian rice, spices, ready‑to‑eat foods, tea, sugar and processed agri‑products. Russian hospitals and pharmacies could become steady buyers of Indian generic medicines and medical devices.
Indian machinery, auto components and electrical equipment can also move in if standards and certification barriers are dealt with. That is exactly why the joint statement emphasised tackling tariff and non‑tariff barriers and removing logistics bottlenecks. Without easier market entry, the $100 billion dollar dream stays on paper.
Energy cooperation now goes beyond just burning fuel. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu is already a flagship of India–Russia civil nuclear cooperation. In Delhi, both sides confirmed they want to broaden that partnership – from fuel cycle support and long‑term life cycle maintenance to non‑power nuclear applications and new high‑tech atomic projects. India has set an ambitious goal: reaching 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
Russia’s role in supplying equipment, technology and fuel for Kudankulam’s remaining units, as well as future plants, locks the two sides into a multi‑decade relationship. For Indian industry, that means opportunities in nuclear components, engineering services and allied manufacturing. For Russia, it means a stable, long‑term market in a sector that many Western countries treat with caution.
To make all of this work, geography has to be rewritten. India and Russia are separated by thousands of kilometres and by unfriendly or unstable regions. So both sides are investing political capital in new transport and trade routes. The International North‑South Transport Corridor promises to move goods by sea, rail and road through Iran and Central Asia, cutting both time and cost. The Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor hopes to connect India’s east coast with Russia’s Far East ports. The Northern Sea Route, along Russia’s Arctic coastline, could one day offer Indian exporters a shorter path to northern Europe and beyond. At the same time, railways in both countries are working together on technology exchange and smoother freight movement. If these corridors truly become efficient, Indian exporters will no longer see Russia as a distant, complicated market, but as a reachable and profitable one.
Behind the diplomatic smiles, there is a tough balancing act. India is facing higher US tariffs and lives in a world where secondary sanctions are a constant threat. Russia is cut off from Western finance and technology but still needs big markets. Delhi wants discounted energy and defence supplies without burning bridges with the West. Moscow wants a dependable partner in Asia who is not China. The renewed $100 billion dollar trade target by 2030 is the economic expression of this mutual need.
Whether it succeeds will depend on things far more technical than summit speeches: how fast payment systems are harmonised, how quickly regulatory walls are lowered, how seriously both sides push food, pharma, textiles and machinery, and how smoothly new trade routes actually work. When that happens, the average Indian may finally know that Russia is not just about tanks and oil, and the average Russian may recognise India as more than a buyer of weapons – as a full‑spectrum economic partner reshaping the map of Eurasian trade.
