On February 5, 2026, the Government of India (GoI), Government of Nagaland (GoN), and the Eastern Nagaland Peoples’ Organisation (ENPO) signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) in New Delhi to establish the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA), granting legislative, executive, and financial autonomy to six eastern districts in Nagaland – Tuensang, Mon, Kiphire, Longleng, Noklak, and Shamator.
The arrangement includes devolution of powers over 46 subjects, creation of a mini-Secretariat, proportional development outlay, and initial financial support from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The agreement explicitly preserves the special constitutional safeguards under Article 371(A), ensuring that Naga customary law, land ownership, and social practices remain outside FNTA’s jurisdiction.
The agreement marks a significant recalibration of New Delhi’s conflict-management strategy in Nagaland, shifting from securitised containment toward administrative accommodation. ENPO, representing eight Naga tribes, had since 2010 demanded a separate “Frontier Nagaland” State, citing chronic underdevelopment, governance neglect, and political marginalisation. The FNTA framework, subject to review after ten years, appears designed as a middle path – offering substantive autonomy without redrawing State boundaries.
From a security perspective, the accord is aimed at pre-empting renewed unrest in a strategically sensitive region bordering Myanmar, long affected by insurgent mobility, arms trafficking, and weak State presence. Eastern Nagaland has historically remained peripheral to peace processes involving Naga armed groups, despite being one of the most underdeveloped parts of the State. Persistent governance deficits created fertile ground for alienation, which insurgent actors have periodically exploited.
Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah framed the agreement as part of a broader push for a “dispute-free Northeast,” noting that 12 accords have been signed in the region since 2019. While this narrative underscores New Delhi’s emphasis on negotiated settlements, the FNTA arrangement also reflects pragmatic conflict prevention. By institutionalising fiscal autonomy and local decision-making, the Centre seeks to absorb regional grievances into formal governance structures, reducing incentives for separatist mobilisation.
However, challenges remain. FNTA’s effectiveness will depend on timely fund flows, administrative capacity, and political coordination between FNTA, GoN, and GoI. Past autonomous arrangements in the Northeast have often faltered due to bureaucratic inertia, overlapping jurisdictions, and elite capture. Moreover, while ENPO leadership has endorsed the agreement, managing expectations at the grassroots level will be critical, particularly in communities that had mobilised for full Statehood.
The agreement also carries implications for Nagaland’s wider peace process. Although it does not directly involve Naga armed groups, the FNTA introduces a new institutional layer that could reshape political dynamics in the State. Careful integration with existing ceasefire frameworks and development programmes will be necessary to prevent fragmentation or competitive claims of representation.
Initial responses from political stakeholders in Nagaland have been mixed but cautious. The ENPO welcomed the FNTA agreement as a historic step toward addressing long-standing developmental and administrative grievances, urging public cooperation in its implementation. The Nagaland Government, while supporting greater autonomy for eastern districts, reiterated opposition to any arrangement implying territorial bifurcation or a separate constitutional article beyond Article 371(A), emphasising State unity and consensus. Other political voices have expressed guarded optimism, stressing that credibility will depend on transparent execution and tangible outcomes. Notably, major Naga armed groups, including the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), have not issued public statements on the FNTA, instead reiterating commitment to the broader Indo-Naga Framework Agreement-signalling cautious distance from parallel political processes outside the primary peace negotiations.
Ultimately, the FNTA represents a calibrated attempt to address structural marginalisation through decentralised governance rather than coercive control. If implemented in letter and spirit, it could serve as a model for addressing sub-regional grievances elsewhere in India’s conflict-affected peripheries. Failure, however, risks reinforcing long-standing perceptions of neglect – potentially reopening space for unrest in one of the Northeast’s most fragile corridors.
Author: Afsara Shaheen – Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
