Nagaland continued to experience a markedly subdued insurgency landscape through 2025, a trend that has extended into the opening weeks of 2026, with militant activity remaining sporadic, fragmented, and largely non-kinetic.
The only insurgency-related incident recorded in the State in 2026, so far, occurred on January 15, when an active cadre of the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I), Amarjit Moran aka Dhananjay, surrendered before Security Forces (SFs) in Mon District. The surrender was symbolically consequential, underscoring the sustained erosion of ULFA-I’s organisational resilience and the diminishing viability of Nagaland’s eastern districts as secure fallback zones for Assam-based insurgent groups.
This development followed a limited but telling series of surrenders recorded in 2025, when at least seven ULFA-I cadres surrendered in four separate incidents across Nagaland, reinforcing a gradual trend of militant attrition.
On September 14, 2025, two ULFA-I cadres, Anupam Asom and Chinmoy Asom, surrendered before the Nagaland Police at an unspecified location in Nagaland.
On August 7, 2025, one ULFA-I cadre, Chunoo Gogoi aka Kalyan Asom (28), surrendered before the Assam Rifles in Nagaland, along the Indo-Myanmar border.
On August 6, 2025, an active ULFA-I cadre, Jit Asom aka Janardan Gogoi, surrendered before authorities in Nagaland. Following his surrender, the former insurgent was taken into Police custody by the Charaideo District Police in Assam for further questioning and legal formalities.
On August 6, 2025 three cadres of ULFA-I, Dwipjyoti Saikia, Antony Moran and Paragjyoti Chetia, surrendered at an Army camp in the Mon District of Nagaland, near the India-Myanmar border.
Collectively, these incidents demonstrated the cumulative impact of sustained counter-insurgency pressure, tightened border surveillance, and declining morale within ULFA-I’s rank and file.
Partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) indicates that Nagaland recorded one militant surrender in 2026, seven in 2025 (all ULFA-I cadres), and five (one Naga National Council-Non Accordist (NNC-NA) and four Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)] in 2024. Since SATP began systematically documenting insurgency trends in the Northeast in 2000, the State has registered a total of 249 militant surrenders across 35 separate incidents. This long-term pattern reflects not only the effectiveness of security operations but also the prolonged stagnation of insurgent political objectives, factionalism, and the gradual normalisation of ceasefire and dialogue mechanisms.
Arrest trends during the same period further corroborated the contraction of insurgent activity. As of mid-January 2026, Nagaland has not recorded any militant arrests, reflecting the near absence of active operational networks on the ground. During 2025, the State recorded the arrest of 11 militants in six separate incidents. These included two cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland– Reformation (NSCN-R), one cadre of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), two cadres of ULFA-I, five cadres of NSCN-K, and one militant whose organisational affiliation could not be ascertained.
In 2024, arrests were comparatively higher, with 20 militants apprehended in 12 incidents, including 13 cadres of NSCN-K, three cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), and one cadre each belonging to ULFA-I, NSCN-K–Yung Aung (NSCN-K-YA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang–Niki Sumi (NSCN-K-NS), along with one unidentified militant. Since 2000, Nagaland has recorded the arrest of 2,372 militants across 1,255 incidents, underscoring the scale of enforcement actions undertaken over the course of the insurgency and the gradual tapering of such interventions in recent years.
Most notably, Nagaland recorded zero insurgency-related fatalities in 2025, marking one of the calmest years since the onset of armed militancy in the State. This continued a downward trend observed over recent years. In 2024, the State recorded three fatalities – two militants and one civilian – in three separate incidents, while in 2023, three militants were killed in two incidents. Since 2000, insurgency- related violence in Nagaland has claimed 833 lives, including 605 militants, 192 civilians, 22 SF personnel, and 14 in the Not-Specified (NS) category, across 455 incidents. The complete absence of fatalities in 2025 is a striking indicator of the dramatic contraction of armed confrontation, though it does not signify the total disappearance of insurgent influence.
Despite the lack of lethal violence, coercive practices by armed groups persist in subtler, but nonetheless consequential forms. On December 30, 2025, two dumper drivers and an excavator operator engaged in a road construction project in Meluri District were attacked at gunpoint by an NSCN-R cadre, identified as a tatar (local functionary) named Müsumi. The incident occurred between Phokhungri town and Avakhung village, where a two-lane road project under Package-III was being executed by Bharat Construction Company Limited. One of the drivers sustained serious injuries. Although the immediate trigger was reportedly a dispute over giving way to a vehicle, the incident vividly illustrates the enduring capacity of armed cadres to resort to intimidation and violence with relative impunity, particularly in remote and poorly governed areas.
Similarly, on October 24, 2025, Nagaland Police rescued an abducted businessman from Dubagaon under Dimapur Police Station and arrested two NSCN-R cadres, Antu Mech (30) and Nagato Sumi (37), along with three accomplices. This incident reaffirmed that abduction and extortion remain integral to the operational economy of splinter groups, even as large-scale insurgent violence has receded. Such criminalised activities underscore a critical transformation in Nagaland’s insurgency, wherein armed groups increasingly function as coercive networks embedded within local socio-economic structures, rather than as ideologically driven revolutionary movements.
Inter-group dynamics further shaped the security environment during 2025. On July 3, 2025, the NSCN- Khaplang faction and the Konyak Union issued a stern warning to ULFA-I, demanding an immediate halt to all activities within Konyak jurisdiction, particularly in the Mon District. The statement accused ULFA-I operatives of continuing to use the area as a safe haven while engaging in abduction and extortion in Assam, despite earlier warnings issued in April 2021. This development was significant, reflecting growing local resistance to the presence of non-Naga insurgent groups and highlighting the increasingly assertive role of tribal bodies in regulating armed activity within their territories.
The political dimension of the Naga issue remained intensely active and deeply contested throughout 2025. On June 11, 2025, the Centre’s interlocutor, A.K. Mishra, held crucial meetings with NSCN-IM ‘general secretary’ Thuingaleng Muivah and representatives of the Working Committee (WC) of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPG) at Camp Hebron in Peren District. The discussions focused on evolving a comprehensive execution framework that could potentially reconcile the 2015 Framework Agreement with the 2017 Agreed Position. Leaders from both sides publicly acknowledged past disunity and expressed cautious optimism, yet core disagreements – particularly NSCN-IM’s insistence on a separate Naga flag and constitution – continued to stall any conclusive settlement.
Frustration over the prolonged negotiations was repeatedly articulated by NSCN-IM leaders. On March 21, 2025, NSCN-IM ‘chairman’ Q. Tuccu accused the Government of India of deliberately delaying a political solution and employing divisive tactics to weaken the organisation’s negotiating position. He alleged that the creation of NNPGs was intended to dilute the Framework Agreement and criticised sections of Naga civil society for aligning with what he described as India-backed factions. Earlier, on January 19, 2025, NSCN-IM accused the Government of India of deceitful handling of the Indo-Naga dialogue, reiterating its sovereign claims and condemning the continued incarceration of its kilonser Alemla Jamir.
Internal fragmentation within Naga political formations remained a persistent impediment. On December 15, 2025, retired ‘general’ Niki Sumi, president of the NSCN-K–Niki Sumi faction (NSCN-K- NS), publicly criticised the splintering of Naga groups, warning that tribal blocs and parallel negotiations were eroding prospects for a unified settlement. His remarks reflected a growing recognition within insurgent and ceasefire signatory circles that disunity has become a structural weakness undermining the Naga movement.
The Government of India maintained a calibrated security posture throughout the year. On September 26, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act for six months in nine districts and 21 police station areas across five additional districts, despite improved security indicators. The extension underscored lingering concerns regarding residual militant influence and the strategic sensitivity of Nagaland’s border districts. Earlier, on September 22, 2025, the Centre
extended the ban on NSCN-K and its factions for another five years under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), citing threats to sovereignty, extortion, and links with other banned outfits.
The political discourse in late 2025 was further complicated by the demand for a Frontier Nagaland Territory. On December 21, 2025, a high-level tripartite meeting between the Government of India, the Government of Nagaland, and the Eastern Nagaland People’s Organisation (ENPO) signalled a serious attempt to address long-standing grievances in the eastern districts. While the talks reduced immediate tensions, they added another layer of complexity to an already intricate political and security landscape.
Overall, 2025 marked a year of conspicuous calm in Nagaland’s insurgency profile, characterised by zero fatalities, limited surrenders, and the near absence of direct armed confrontation. However, this calm rests on a fragile equilibrium sustained by ceasefires, political fatigue, and tactical restraint rather than by a conclusive resolution of core issues. The persistence of coercive criminal activity, factional fragmentation, and unresolved political demands suggests that, while large-scale violence has receded, the structural drivers of instability endure. While security indicators point toward consolidation, the durability of peace will remain contingent on achieving a credible, inclusive, and unified political settlement acceptable to all stakeholders.
Author: Afsara Shaheen- Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
