Sri Lanka entered 2026 with a security environment that remained broadly stable but layered with unresolved structural vulnerabilities rooted in post-war reconciliation failures, persistent diaspora activism, narcotics trafficking, and evolving regional security dynamics.
While the country continued to record an absence of terrorism-linked fatalities, sustaining its position among the lowest-risk nations globally, the year nonetheless underscored the paradox of “negative peace” – The absence of violence without the resolution of underlying political and ethnic contestations.
The National People’s Power (NPP) Government, led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, inherited a security architecture shaped by long-standing counterterrorism frameworks, and largely opted for continuity rather than rupture, particularly in matters related to proscription regimes and intelligence-led policing.
A defining development shaping the 2026 security narrative was the January 13 decision of the NPP Government to issue an extraordinary gazette extending the long-standing ban on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and multiple Tamil diaspora organisations and individuals.
By reissuing and updating the May 2025 proscription list, the Government reaffirmed its position that overseas Tamil political and advocacy bodies continued to pose security risks through alleged terrorism-related activities.
Organisations such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC), World Tamil Movement (WTM), Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), World Tamil Relief Fund (WTRF), National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT), and Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO) remain blacklisted, with updated identification details and new reference numbers issued for 2026.
Although no substantive new allegations were introduced, the continuation of this sweeping proscription regime reinforced the securitised lens through which the Sri Lankan State continues to view diaspora mobilisation more than 15 years after the end of the civil war. Originally introduced in 2014 under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the proscription framework continues to criminalise contact with listed entities, constraining political engagement and perpetuating mistrust between the State and Tamil communities abroad.
The persistence of such measures stood in sharp contrast to the Government’s stated commitment to reform and accountability and was further complicated by international scrutiny on unresolved war-time accountability. In June 2025, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) Volker Türk’s visit to Sri Lanka brought renewed global attention to the issue of alleged enforced disappearances and accountability for alleged war crimes.
Türk met families of the missing in Trincomalee and Jaffna District and received a joint letter from major Tamil political parties, including the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi, All Ceylon Tamil Congress, and Tamil National People’s Front, warning against the instrumentalisation of international engagement to legitimise State inaction. The absence of tangible progress on accountability, even 16 years after the civil war, continued to fuel Tamil grievances, reinforcing diaspora activism that Colombo simultaneously seeks to suppress through legal mechanisms.
Despite these political fault lines, Sri Lanka’s internal security indicators remained strong. The country continued to benefit from the dismantling of organised terrorist infrastructure following the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 and the sustained weakening of Islamist extremist networks after the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks.
Sri Lanka’s zero score in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index and its ranking at 100 out of 163 countries reflected this reality. However, the State remained vigilant against residual extremist threats, particularly transnational Islamic State (IS)-linked networks, as demonstrated by arrests and surveillance operations carried out in preceding years. Intelligence-sharing with regional partners, especially India, remained a key pillar of Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism posture, as illustrated by heightened security checks at Bandaranaike International Airport in May 2025 following intelligence inputs related to a terrorist attack in India.
This overall stability was further corroborated by SATP data, which recorded zero insurgency-related fatalities, insurgent arrests, or surrenders throughout 2025. The absence of any measurable insurgent activity underscored the consolidation of Sri Lanka’s post-war security environment and reinforced official assessments that no organised militant formations were operational within the country during the year.
Another critical dimension shaping the 2026 security outlook was Sri Lanka’s escalating battle against narcotics trafficking, which has increasingly intersected with organised crime and maritime security challenges. On January 18, 2026, Police Media Spokesman Assistant Superintendent of Police F. U. Wootler disclosed that Sri Lanka Police seized over 1,821 kilograms of heroin during island-wide anti- narcotics operations in 2025. Additional seizures included more than 17,189 kilograms of cannabis, 3,865 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine (ICE), and nearly four million narcotic pills.
These figures highlighted Sri Lanka’s growing role as both a transit and destination hub within Indian Ocean narcotics networks, driven by its strategic location along major maritime routes. The Government’s decision to continue daily drug raids throughout 2026 under the direct supervision of the Inspector General of Police reflected recognition of narcotics as a serious national security threat, with implications for public health, crime, and institutional corruption.
Efforts to strengthen the credibility of enforcement mechanisms were further reflected in the judicially supervised destruction of seized narcotics. In 2024, nearly 1.9 metric tonnes of heroin, ICE, ketamine, and cocaine were incinerated at facilities in Wanathawilluwa and Puttalam, while an additional 665 kilograms of heroin were destroyed between 2025 and early 2026. These measures were aimed at addressing longstanding concerns over the re-circulation of seized drugs and enhancing public trust in law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the scale of seizures underscored the resilience and adaptability of trafficking networks operating across maritime and coastal regions, often exploiting economic vulnerabilities among fishing communities.
Politically, 2026 marked the consolidation phase of the NPP administration, which came to power in 2024 on a platform of anti-corruption, social justice, and systemic reform. While the leadership projected a reformist image, particularly in economic governance, its approach to national security and ethnic reconciliation revealed a cautious pragmatism. The continuation of LTTE-related proscriptions, asset freezes, and surveillance frameworks indicated an unwillingness to dismantle entrenched security doctrines, even as the Government sought to distinguish itself from previous regimes. This balancing act reflected the enduring influence of the security establishment and the political risks associated with appearing “soft” on issues tied to separatism and terrorism.
Regionally, Sri Lanka’s security calculations continued to be influenced by instability in the wider South Asian and Middle Eastern theatres. The 2024 Arugam Bay threat against Israeli tourists, linked to tensions arising from the Gaza conflict, remained a reminder of Sri Lanka’s exposure to global geopolitical currents. Although no comparable incident occurred in 2025, the episode reinforced the need for robust intelligence coordination and protection of the tourism sector, a critical pillar of economic recovery.
Internationally, Sri Lanka maintained engagement with multilateral counterterrorism frameworks, building on earlier participation in initiatives such as the Combined Maritime Forces and its chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. The European Union’s extension of its LTTE ban in July 2024 continued into the assessment period, providing Colombo with diplomatic validation of its counterterrorism stance. At the same time, Western governments and UN mechanisms sustained pressure on Sri Lanka to address accountability deficits, creating a dual-track international environment of cooperation and criticism.
In sum, Sri Lanka’s security environment in 2026 is characterised by stability without closure. The absence of terrorist violence masked deeper unresolved tensions rooted in ethnic reconciliation, diaspora-State relations, and transitional justice.
While the NPP Government succeeded in maintaining law and order and strengthening narcotics enforcement, it stopped short of initiating transformative reforms in the security sector or accountability mechanisms. The persistence of expansive proscription regimes and securitised governance approaches risks entrenching long-term grievances, even as immediate threats remain contained. Sri Lanka’s challenge moving forward lies in transitioning from a security paradigm focused on control and continuity to one that addresses the political and social foundations of lasting peace, without undermining the hard-won gains of post-war stability.
Author: Afsara Shaheen- Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
